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11 Introduction
In this paper we show how national ﬁscal policy can help to stabilise individual economies
within a monetary union. While the vulnerability of monetary unions to asymmetric
shocks is well known, there has been little analysis of the extent to which ﬁscal policy can
overcome these problems within the framework of the new international macroeconomics
(see Lane (2001), Ganelli and Lane (2003) for a survey of this literature). This is despite
the fact that policy makers in potential members of the European Monetary Union have
actively discussed the possibility of using ﬁscal policy in this way (Treasury, 2003; Swedish
Committee, 2002).
Since the work of Mundell (1961) and the subsequent Optimum Currency Area liter-
ature, it has been recognised that members of a monetary union would be vulnerable to
asymmetric shocks. It has also been recognised that union members could in principle
reduce this vulnerability by using ﬁscal policy in a countercyclical manner. While earlier
studies have suggested that ﬁscal policy could be eﬀective in this role (see Hughes Hallett
and Vines (1991), and Driver and Wren-Lewis (1999) for example), they have tended to
use models without explicit microfoundations. The value of clear microfoundations when
analysing ﬁscal policy is apparent: it is important to consider the impact of ﬁscal actions
on agents’ lifetime income, on labour supply as well as consumption, and on the solvency
of the government. We can use a setup with these features to conduct a rigorous analysis
of whether the requirement that ﬁscal policy ensures debt stability conﬂicts with the use
of ﬁscal policy for macroeconomic stabilisation. A microfounded model can also allow us
to derive a social welfare metric (see Woodford (2003)), which can be used to rank policy
outcomes.
A number of recent papers have examined joint stabilisation by monetary and ﬁscal
authorities acting optimally in the context of microfounded models with derived social
welfare in a closed economy setting; see Benigno and Woodford (2004), Dixit and Lam-
bertini (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) amongst many others. This approach
can be extended to analyse a monetary union, with a union-wide monetary authority and
individual national ﬁscal authorities. A natural set-up to adopt here is a two-country
framework, where the union as a whole is a closed economy, and we follow this approach.
(In contrast, Gali and Monacelli (2005b) assume the union is made up of a number of
economies that are ‘small’ in relation to the union, which reduces the extent of interaction
between economies.)
Our analytical framework is perhaps closest to that of a recent paper by Beetsma
and Jensen (2005), whose model is in turn based on a model developed in Benigno and
Benigno (2000). However our analysis is more general than theirs in three important
respects.1 First, while their representative consumers are identical across countries (and
therefore consume an identical basket), we allow for some home bias in consumption,
along lines that are familiar from Gali and Monacelli (2005a), for example2. Second,
while both papers embody nominal inertia in the form of Calvo contracts, we also allow
for some additional inﬂation inertia, using a set up outlined in Steinsson (2003). This
not only makes our model more realistic3, but it also creates a greater potential need
for ﬁscal policy to moderate the dynamic response to shocks. Inﬂation inertia introduces
a key potential instability into the economies of the union4, and so a stabilising ﬁscal
1policy may become vital. Third, we introduce the government solvency constraint in
the model. As a result, we can directly study the potential conﬂict between the short-
run task of macroeconomic stabilisation and the long-run task of debt stabilisation of
the ﬁscal authorities. In our main case, we follow most of the literature in assuming
consumers are inﬁnitely lived. However, in examining the robustness of our results we
also adopt in Section 5 the constant probability of death model due to Blanchard (1985),
which provides a source of non-Ricardian consumer behaviour that is in addition to the
distortionary taxes already present in the model. Allowing for this may also be important
when looking at the interrelationships between debt management and macroeconomic
stabilisation.
Our focus is on simple ﬁscal policy rules, rather than completely optimal ﬁscal policy
(although we do compute the latter as a benchmark). This seems justiﬁed given the
institutional constraints which would prevent the ‘ﬁne tuning’ that is associated with
fully optimal policy. (In contrast, we allow full optimisation by the union wide monetary
policy). We show that rules that relate government spending to lagged inﬂation, output
and the terms of trade can signiﬁcantly reduce the impact of asymmetric shocks.5 We
also show that these rules can be restricted, with only a small welfare loss, to rules
which relate government spending, on the one hand, to diﬀerences between countries in
inﬂation and, on the other hand, to either national diﬀerences between countries in output
or changes in the terms of trade. This result is important for the political economy
debate on using ﬁscal policy as a countercyclical tool within EMU (see e.g. Calmfors
(2003)). However, if, as some have suggested, ﬁscal policy reacts merely to output, or to
output diﬀerences, without being concerned with inﬂation, then it is much less eﬀective
at reducing the welfare consequences of asymmetric shocks, a result which has important
implications for some practical proposals for stabilisation within EMU (Westaway, 2003;
Swedish Committee, 2002).
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical structure of the
model. The calibration of the model is discussed in Section 3. The main results, which
were summarised in the previous paragraph, are presented in Section 4. Then, in Section
5, we introduce Blanchard-Yaari consumers into the model. We do this in order to show
that this important additional channel of ﬁscal inﬂuence, present in a model with this
feature, does not greatly inﬂuence our results. In particular we show that, even in this
more general model, the use of ﬁscal policy for short-run macroeconomic stabilisation




Our monetary union consists of two symmetric economies, labelled a and b. Each of these
is inhabited by a large number of individuals and ﬁrms. Each representative individual
specialises in the production of one diﬀerentiated good, denoted by z, and spends h(z) of
eﬀort on its production. The household consumes a consumption basket C, and also de-
rives utility from per capita government consumption G. Private and public consumption
2are not perfect substitutes.
In each of the two economies the consumption basket consists of two composite goods,
the domestic composite good (produced in the home country), and the foreign composite
good from the other open economy. Each composite good in turn consists of a continuum
of produced goods z ∈ [0,1]. In order not to repeat symmetric equations, we will use the
index k for a single country in the union, and the index j for other country, such that if
k = a then j = b, or if k = b then j = a.
Preferences of individuals are assumed to be (Et is an expectation operator, conditional








s−t[u(Ck,s,ξk,s) + f(Gk,s,ξk,s) − v(hk,s(z),ξk,s)], (1)
where we allow for taste/technology shocks ξ. Domestically produced goods may be con-





j(z) + gk(z), (2)
where the superscript denotes the source of goods, so that ck
j denotes goods produced
in country k but consumed in the other country, and where the common time index is
suppressed for notational convenience. We assume that government consumption gk(z)
only involves domestically produced goods.
All goods are aggregated into a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) consumption index with the
elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods given by ǫt > 1 (which is a stochastic















Every household consumes both domestic and foreign goods with the elasticity of




















where αd is the share of consumption of domestic goods, αn = 1− αd.
2.2 Demand: Optimal Consumption Decisions
An individual chooses optimal consumption and work eﬀort to maximise the criterion (1)
subject to the demand system and the budget constraint:
Pk,tCk,t + Et (Qt,t+1Ak,t+1) ≤ Ak,t + (1 − τ)(wk,t(z)hk,t(z) + Πk,t(z)) + Tk,t,
where Pk,t is a CPI price index deﬁned below, At are nominal ﬁnancial assets of a household
and Πt is proﬁt. Here w is the wage rate, τ a tax rate on income and T are lump-sum
3government subsidies. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, which is identical for all
individuals, which determines the price in period t to the individual of being able to
carry a state-contingent amount At+1 of wealth into period t+1. The riskless short term






We assume no Ponzi schemes and that the net present value of individual’s future
income is bounded. We also assume that the nominal interest rate is positive at all times.
These assumptions rule out inﬁnite consumption (either because of inﬁnite future income,
or because money would pay a higher return than bonds) and allow us to replace the












(1 − τ)(wk,v(z)hk,v(z) + Πk,v(z))dz
￿
.
The household optimisation problem is standard (Woodford, 2003) and, after lineari-
sation, it leads to the following ﬁrst order condition for country k, written in terms of
deviations from the steady state (for each variable Xt with steady state value X, we use
the notation ˆ Xt = ln(Xt/X)):
ˆ Ck,t = Et ˆ Ck,t+1 − σ(ˆ ıt − Etˆ πk,t+1) + ˆ ξk,t, (6)
where σ = −uC(C,1)/uCC(C,1)C is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.



















, and we sup-
press the common time subscript.


















Hj is the price of goods produced in country j in country k’s currency. The









We deﬁne the terms of trade Sk, the nominal exchange rate Ek, and the real exchange













42.3 Supply: Pricing Decisions by Firms
In order to describe price setting decisions we split ﬁrms into two groups according to
their pricing behaviour, following Steinsson (2003). In each period, each ﬁrm is able to
reset its price with probability 1 − γ, and otherwise, with probability γ, its price will
rise at the steady state rate of domestic inﬂation. Among those ﬁrms which are able to
reset their price, a proportion 1−ω are forward-looking and set prices optimally, while a
fraction ω are backward-looking and set their prices according to a rule of thumb.
Forward-looking ﬁrms are proﬁt-maximising, and reset prices (P F
Hk,t) optimally, which
in terms of log-deviations from the steady state (see Appendix7 A.2) implies:
ˆ P
F
Hk,t = γβEt ˆ P
F

















)ˆ ξk,t + ˆ  k,t
￿
,
where πHk,t is domestic inﬂation in country k. ˆ  k,t is a mark-up shock.













Hk,t−1 is the average domestic price in the previous period, ΠHk,t = PHk,t/PHk,t−1
is the past period’s growth rate of prices and Yk,t/Y n
k,t is output relative to the ﬂexible-price
equilibrium. For the economy as a whole, the price equation can be written as:
PH,t = [γ(ΠPH,t−1)
1−ǫt + (1 − γ)(1 − ω)(P
F
H,t)






Following Steinsson (2003) and allowing for government consumption terms in the
utility function, we can derive the following Phillips curve for our economy, written in
terms of log-deviations from the steady state8:
ˆ πHk,t = χ
fβEtˆ πHk,t+1 + χ
bˆ πHk,t−1 + κc ˆ Ck,t + κs ˆ Sk,t (14)






)ˆ ξk,t + ˆ  k,t,








γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
, δ =
(1 − γβ)(ψ + σ)
γσ (ψ + ǫ)
,
κc =
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)ψ
(γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ))(ψ + ǫ)σ
, κy1 =
(1 − γ)ω
γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
δ,
κy0 =
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)
(γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ))(ψ + ǫ)
−
(1 − γ)γβω
γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
δ,
κs =
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)ψαn
(γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ))(ψ + ǫ)
.
The constant income tax rate τ does not appear in formula (14) because we have used
the ﬁrst order condition (see (18) below) to substitute for the equilibrium post-tax real
5wage. Although the constant income tax rate has no eﬀect on the dynamic equations for
log-deviations from the ﬂexible price equilibrium, it alters the equilibrium choice between
consumption and leisure for the consumer. The Phillips curve (14) has a structure in
which both current and past output have an eﬀect on inﬂation. The presence of the terms
of trade in the Phillips curve is due to the fact that people consume a basket of goods
which includes imports but, of course, produce only domestic goods.
2.4 The Economy as a Whole
2.4.1 Aggregate Demand
Market clearing condition (2) can be aggregated across all goods to yield the condition
that output produced in country k is consumed by either the domestic or foreign private






Substituting consumption from the demand system (20) and log-linearising, we obtain
the following relationship (see Appendix A.5 for the derivation):
ˆ Yk,t = θαd ˆ Ck,t + θαn ˆ Cj,t + (1 − θ) ˆ Gk,t + 2θηαnαd ˆ S k,t. (15)
The demand for the home country’s products depends on consumption at home and
overseas, but only on home government spending by assumption. The parameter θ denotes
the share of private consumption in output, so 1−θ is the share of the government sector in
the economy. The presence of the terms of trade reﬂects the direct eﬀect of competitiveness
on demand: with an increase in the terms of trade home goods become more competitive,
and therefore it leads to an increase in the demand for home produced goods.
2.4.2 Aggregate Supply
The Phillips curve equation (14) contains terms in the preference shock ξ. It will be con-
venient to replace them by consumption, output and the terms of trade at their ‘natural’
level (superscript n), which is the level of these variables that would occur in an economy
with ﬂexible prices and no mark-up shocks. Consumer optimisation implies that the real
post tax wage is equal to the ratio of marginal utilities in the usual way (we assume the








As discussed in Appendix A.2, we assume an employment subsidy  w, paid for by lump-
sum taxes T, of the size necessary to entirely remove all the distortions resulting from
both the monopoly power of producers and the eﬀect of taxes.
Proﬁt maximisation relates the real product wage to the monopolistic mark-up  t =







6Taking the relationship (16) in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium with no mark up shocks, and






























)ˆ ξk = 0. (19)
We use this formula to substitute out the taste shock from the Phillips curve (14).
2.4.3 Fiscal Constraint
We assume that the government buys goods (G), taxes income (with tax rate τ), and
issues nominal debt B. The evolution of the nominal debt stock can be written as:
Bk,t+1 = (1 + it)(Bk,t + Gk,tPHk,t − τYk,tPHk,t). (20)
This equation can be linearised as (deﬁning Bt = Bt/Pt−1) :







where ρ is the steady state level of real bonds as a share of Y and i is steady state level
of the interest rate. If consumers live forever, (1 + i) = 1/β.
There is no capital in this model, so
Aa,t + Ab,t = Ba,t + Bb,t.
2.4.4 Financial Markets
Monetary union implies a common nominal interest rate in the two countries. We assume
there exists a complete set of ﬁnancial markets, so there is complete international risk





















Following Gali and Monacelli (2005a), we iterate this formula forward, and substitute
the real exchange rate as a function of the terms of trade, log-linearise and obtain the
following relationship (detailed derivation is given in Appendix A.4):
ˆ Ca,t = ˆ Cb,t + σ (αd − αn) ˆ S a,t − (1 − σ) (ξa,t − ξb,t). (22)
7Risk sharing allows consumers to insure against individual country income risk. Thus
consumption is equal in both countries, aside from changes in the cost of consumption
reﬂected in movements in the terms of trade. If the terms of trade in country a increase,
this implies the cost of consumption in a relative to b falls (providing αd − αn > 0) ,
leading to higher consumption in a relative to b.
Under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
ˆ Sa,t = πHb,t − πHa,t + ˆ Sa,t−1. (23)
2.5 Putting things together
We now write down the ﬁnal system of equations for the ‘law of motion’ of the out-of-
steady-state economy. We simplify notation by denoting gap variables with lower case
letters: for any variable xt = ˆ Xt − ˆ Xn
t . We use relationship (19) to substitute out the ξ–
shock term in the Phillips curve, which enables us to rewrite some of the dynamic system
in ‘gap’ form. We denote s = sa = −sb. We also substitute for consumer price inﬂation
so as to obtain all equations in terms of domestic inﬂation and the terms of trade. We
omit the expectational superscript, assuming rational expectations, EtXt+1 = Xt+1 for
any variable X. As a result the complete system is
ca,t = ca,t+1 − σ(it − αdπHa,t+1 − αnπHb,t+1) + ˆ ζa,t, (24)
cb,t = cb,t+1 − σ(it − αdπHb,t+1 − αnπHa,t+1) + ˆ ζb,t, (25)
πHa,t = χ
fβπHa,t+1 + χ
bπHa,t−1 + κcca,t + κy0ya,t + κy1ya,t−1 + κsst + ˆ  a,t, (26)
πHb,t = χ
fβπHb,t+1 + χ
bπHb,t−1 + κccb,t + κy0yb,t + κy1yb,t−1 − κsst + ˆ  b,t, (27)
ya,t = (1 − θ)ga,t + θαdca,t + θαncb,t + 2θηαdαnst, (28)
yb,t = (1 − θ)gb,t + θαdcb,t + θαnca,t − 2θηαdαnst, (29)







+ i(1 − αD)st + ˆ κa,t,







− i(1 − αD)st + ˆ κb,t,




(ya,t − (1 − αD)st) −
θ
ρ
ca,t) + ˆ ηa,t,
ˆ Ab,t = ˆ Ba,t + ˆ Bb,t − ˆ Aa,t, (33)
st = πHb,t − πHa,t + st−1 + ˆ νt. (34)
Equations (24) - (25) are the consumption equations for each country from (6), written
in terms of domestic inﬂation. Equations (28) and (29) are aggregate demand equations
from (15). Equation (34) is equation (23) written in gap variables, see Appendix A.7.
The terms ˆ ζ, ˆ ν,ˆ κ and ˆ η are composite shocks that are combinations of the taste shock
8ˆ ξ and the natural variables, as shown in Appendix A.7. In an open economy with a
ﬂexible exchange rate, taste shocks need not inﬂuence gap variables as monetary policy
can ensure that any real adjustment will occur without the need for nominal prices to
change. However, an asymmetric taste shock in an economy in a monetary union will
require nominal prices to change (to achieve any change in the real exchange rate, for
example), and so taste shocks will inﬂuence gap variables in the analysis presented here.
The cost-push shocks ˆ   are distortionary and are uncorrelated with taste shocks and thus
with any of ˆ ζ, ˆ ν,ˆ κ and ˆ η.
2.6 Policy Framework
In this paper, we study simple and potentially implementable ﬁscal rules. We postulate
that ﬁscal authorities operate with rules of the following general form
gk,t = θπkπk,t−1 + θπjπj,t−1 + θykyk,t−1 + θyjyj,t−1 + θssk,t−1 + θbk ˆ Bk,t. (35)
Government spending in country k can potentially react to both home and overseas in-
ﬂation and output, the terms of trade and its own government debt, although we also
investigate restricted versions of this rule where some of the θk parameters are set to zero.
For all these variables, we assume a one period lag (one quarter) before spending can react,
reﬂecting institutional delays in ﬁscal decision making. In practice, delays in ﬁscal policy
decision making may be longer than this: ﬁscal budgets are generally approved on an
annual basis and budget execution is often subject to rigidities and/or cyclical patterns.
However, we have not imposed longer lags for three reasons. First, institutional practice
varies considerably among countries. Second, these lags may not be immutable, partic-
ularly if ﬁscal policy starts being used for stabilisation purposes among EMU countries.
Third, it seems appropriate in the context of policy optimisation to investigate, at least
as a ﬁrst step, what ﬁscal policy could potentially do in the most favourable institutional
circumstances. Further work could then introduce additional constraints associated with
particular ﬁscal instruments in particular institutional contexts. (Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2006b) show in the context of a small open economy that additional lags do reduce
the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal actions, but ﬁscal stabilisation can still have signiﬁcant welfare
beneﬁts, particularly if shocks are persistent.)
Monetary policy, in contrast, is considered to be optimal and not subject to imple-
mentation lags, and will take into account all available information. We assume monetary
policy is formulated under commitment (i.e. it is time inconsistent). We have checked
that the results are similar if we assume a discretionary (time consistent) policy.
If the ﬁscal authorities are given such rules, and monetary authorities use optimal
policy, this leads to stochastic equilibria that should be compared across a suitable metric.
The coeﬃcients θk are then chosen such that they would optimise the chosen welfare
criterion. Clearly setting some θk to zero reduces the information set that the ﬁscal
authorities can respond to, so worse outcomes will be achieved. In this paper we examine
the magnitude of the cost of these restrictions.
The social loss is an aggregation of individual losses, taken across all individuals. As all
individuals are identical, and live forever, the aggregate loss for each country is simply the
individual loss of the representative, inﬁnitely lived agent. For the union which consists
9of two identical countries, the social loss is a sum of the two losses for each country and










where the intra-period loss Us takes the form (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
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where term Zs collects all terms independent of policy and all terms which are higher
than the second order.
There are two unconventional features of this loss function. First, terms with  −coeﬃcients
are present only because of the persistence due to rule of thumb price setters. These terms
reﬂect the fact that, in these circumstances, welfare will be higher if any changes to inﬂa-
tion and output happen gradually. Steinsson (2003) has shown that when the private sec-
tor is predominantly backward-looking, these terms dominate the loss function. Second,
the terms with weights denoted by ν arise in an open economy. With taste/technology
shocks it is in general no longer optimal in an open economy to reproduce the ﬂexible
price equilibrium, because changes in the terms of trade alter the impact of the monopoly
distortion, and this introduces what Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2006) describe as
‘linear in policy’ terms.
We assume that the monetary authorities use a union-wide social welfare function.
However, as monetary policy cannot react to diﬀerences between the two economies (where











































This eliminates cross terms from (37). Alternatively, and equivalently, it is the closed
economy version of (37).
10To interpret the resulting values of the social loss, we can express them in terms of
compensating consumption – the permanent fall in the steady state consumption level that
would balance the welfare gain from eliminating the volatility of consumption, government
spending and leisure (Lucas, 1987). As explained in Appendix C, the percentage change
in consumption level, Ω, that is needed to compensate diﬀerences in welfare of two regimes











(In brief, this is the relevant solution of a quadratic equation which relates the (quadratic)
gain in the steady-state level of consumption to the diﬀerence in losses due to the vari-
ability of the key macroeconomic variables under two diﬀerent policy regimes.)
3 Calibration
Because of the microfounded nature of the model, there are relatively few parameters to
calibrate. One period is taken as equal to one quarter of a year. We set the discount
factor of the private sector (and policy makers) to β = 0.99.We follow the literature
in setting γ = 0.75, which implies that, on average, prices last for one year. For the
parameters related to ﬁscal policy, we calibrate the ratio of private consumption to output
as 75 percent; and we assume that the equilibrium ratio of domestic debt to output is
60 percent. Then the debt accumulation equation gives us the equilibrium level of the
primary surplus and the tax rate. Parameters for the openness of the economies are
αd = 0.7, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is σ = 0.5 and the elasticity of
substitution between foreign and domestic goods is η = 2 (see Lombardo and Sutherland
(2004)).
Perhaps the most important parameter in our model is the proportion of rule of thumb
price setters, ω. Our knowledge regarding inﬂation persistence is very insecure. All empiri-
cal studies are unanimous in concluding that an empirical Phillips curve has a statistically
signiﬁcant backward-looking component. The estimates of the exact weights χf and χb,
however, diﬀer widely. Gali and Gertler (1999), Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) ﬁnd
a predominantly forward-looking speciﬁcation of the Phillips curve, while Mehra (2004)
ﬁnds an extremely backward-looking speciﬁcation. Mankiw (2001) argues that stylised
empirical facts are inconsistent with a predominantly forward-looking Phillips Curve. As
a result of this ambiguity, we look at two values of ω: ω = 0.0, which is the New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve, and ω = 0.75, which leads to an equal weight on forward and backward
inﬂation terms, as suggested by results in Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
This calibration completely deﬁnes the coeﬃcients of the welfare function. In order to
evaluate the social loss, which results from the optimal policies which we have designed, we
assume that the standard deviations of cost-push and taste/technology shocks are equal.
This is common in the literature, in which a consensus number is 0.5% (e.g. Jensen and
McCallum (2002), Bean, Nikolov, and Larsen (2002)). All shocks are independent.
114 Results
4.1 Key Findings
Table 1 presents some key results for the model with inﬁnitely-lived consumers and a
mix of backward and forward looking price setters (ω = 0.75). The columns of the Ta-
ble display the results for diﬀerent forms of ﬁscal policy rule, where in each case the
parameter values shown are the optimal values computed in the face of cost-push and
taste/technology shocks. We also show the feedback parameters for optimal monetary
policy in each case: however, these parameters should be interpreted with caution, be-
cause they are part of an optimal rule under commitment which also involves additional
Lagrange multipliers9. The social loss under each policy, measured in absolute loss units,
is shown in the ﬁrst row, while the second row computes the gain in consumption units
relative to the ﬁrst column (in which there is no ﬁscal stabilisation).The ﬁrst column of
numbers (labelled ‘debt only’) represents the case where there is no ﬁscal stabilisation,
although there is a feedback on debt.
In all cases ﬁscal policy stabilises debt, but, in each case, the optimal coeﬃcient is
small. It is large enough to ensure that the government’s debt stock reaches its steady
state value, but otherwise small enough to give policy the freedom to also help stabilise
output and inﬂation. The reason why very slow adjustment of debt may be optimal is
explored extensively in Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006).
We begin at the right of the Table. In the last three columns in the table (headed
‘inﬂation only’, ‘ToT only’ and ‘output only’) we allow ﬁscal policy to feedback only on a
single variable: national diﬀerences in inﬂation, the terms of trade between the countries
and national diﬀerences in output respectively. There is a moderate welfare gain in each
case, although the gain is twice as large when output alone is used. The column headed
‘diﬀerences’ has ﬁscal feedback on all three variables, and there is a further improvement
in welfare. However the two intermediate columns (headed ‘excl ToT’ and ‘excl output’)
suggest that the main welfare gain comes from including both inﬂation and one other
variable, which can be either output or the terms of trade. This is an important result in
the light of some proposals (Treasury (2003)) which have suggested that national ﬁscal
policy focus exclusively on output gaps, and not on inﬂation. Our results suggest this
would be clearly suboptimal. In all cases the signs of the ﬁscal feedback on inﬂation and
output are as we would expect. The sign of the terms of trade feedback implies that
government spending is reduced if s rises (i.e. there is a real depreciation), for reasons
we discuss further below. The consumption equivalent gain in allowing this form of ﬁscal
feedback is signiﬁcant, at between a quarter and a third of one percent of consumption. We
can also note that the optimal union-wide monetary policy appears to be ‘conventional’ in
all these cases: interest rates rise in response to a cost-push shock, an increase in output
or an increase in inﬂation.
How important is the restriction that ﬁscal policy reacts only to national diﬀerences
in output or inﬂation? This is explored in the second and third columns. In the column
headed ‘home only’, the ﬁscal authority in each country reacts to the level of inﬂation
and/or output in his or her own country, rather than to diﬀerences with the other country.
The column headed ‘full rule’ is less restrictive still, and allows the ﬁscal authority to react
12to output and inﬂation in the other country as well to the level of these variables in their
own country. In each case there is a further gain in welfare, but it is relatively small.
However note the parameters on the monetary policy rule in each case. In ‘home only’,
monetary policy reacts perversely to increases in output and inﬂation. In ‘full rule’ it
reacts perversely to cost-push shocks. In these cases ﬁscal policy is ‘substituting’ for
monetary policy in that ﬁscal policy is stabilising the monetary union at the aggregate
level. Many would regard such ‘displacement’ of monetary policy by ﬁscal policy, in
stabilising aggregates for the union as a whole, as undesirable, and this is what motivates
our focus on ﬁscal feedback on national diﬀerences.
A ‘constraint’ placed on ﬁscal policy in all the cases discussed so far is that it does
not react to contemporary shocks. Whilst this may be realistic given institutional lags in
ﬁscal policy, it is interesting to note the cost of this constraint. The column headed ‘full
and shock’ illustrates the eﬀects obtained by adding feedback to the cost push shock to
the feedback used in the ‘diﬀerences’ column. There is some small additional gain.
Finally, the bottom line of Table 1 reports the welfare loss that would occur if both
ﬁscal authorities cooperate with monetary authorities and jointly stabilise the union as a
whole, taking into account all available information (including contemporary shocks) and
acting under commitment.
4.2 The Performance of Rules
A comparison of the columns headed ‘diﬀerences’ and ‘debt only’ indicates substantial
welfare gains from an active ﬁscal policy that reacts to inﬂation and output diﬀerentials
and the terms of trade. The consumption equivalent gain in allowing this form of ﬁscal
feedback is around a third of one percent. (Hughes Hallett and Vines (1991) and Driver
and Wren-Lewis (1999) ﬁnd gains of the same order of magnitude in less microfounded
models.)
Figure 1 illustrates the two cases, presenting impulse responses to an asymmetric cost-
push shock. The shock raises inﬂation. But with interest rates given by the centralised
monetary policy, this means that the real interest rate will fall. This violation of the Taylor
principle – which is inevitable in a monetary union following an asymmetric inﬂation shock
when there is inﬂation persistence – tends to cause higher demand which would further
augment the shock. The feedback on inﬂation in the ‘diﬀerences’ rule, and in all of the
rules whose performance that we describe in Table 1, moderates this destabilising eﬀect.
The increase in inﬂation has another eﬀect in a monetary union: it leads to a deterio-
ration in competitiveness. This helps reduce output, which in turn brings inﬂation back
to base. But inﬂation must now fall below base, in order to return the terms of trade to its
initial level, which is necessary in a monetary union. However when the terms of trade has
done this, inﬂation is still negative, so the terms of trade (the price level) will overshoot.
This will lead to high demand in the future, which will cause a return of inﬂation and
higher prices and so on. The correction mechanism is inherently cyclical. Figure 1 shows
the damped cyclical response in output which occurs when there is no ﬁscal stabilisation.
This cycle is largely removed if ﬁscal policy not only reacts to diﬀerences in inﬂation
– for reasons described in the previous paragraph – but is allowed to react to national
diﬀerences in output. We can see that feature at work in Figure 1. Government spending
13initially falls following the shock , in order to help counter the increase in inﬂation. But
then, once inﬂation has fallen, government spending rises. We can describe this increase
in government spending as ‘supporting’ output so as to prevent cyclical behaviour. If
ﬁscal policy instead reacts to both inﬂation and the terms of trade the same eﬀect can be
achieved. We could re-describe what happens in Figure 1 as being that ﬁscal policy ‘keeps
output up so as prevent inﬂation falling so low that the price level overshoots’. That is
to say, feedback on the terms of trade can be viewed, at least in part, as a substitute for
feedback on output.10
As a check on how stabilisation works, we increased the size of the competitiveness
elasticity (η), which means that a unit worsening of competitiveness (caused, say, by our
initial inﬂationary shock) would cause a larger reduction in output. We found that the
optimal feedback on the terms of trade increased proportionately, as one would expect.
To understand one of the key reasons for the gains from the ﬁscal stabilisation we can
look at Table 2, which repeats the same exercise for the case where the Phillips curve is
purely forward-looking (i.e. New Keynesian). We observe a similar pattern, in that ﬁscal
feedback on all three variables is preferable to the no ﬁscal feedback case. However, with a
New Keynesian Phillips curve, feedback on inﬂation alone appears to be more important
than feedback on either output or the terms of trade (compare columns ‘inﬂation only’
with the two next columns) and when there is joint feedback the response to output is
perverse. Experimentation suggests that the reason for this is that the welfare function
is very ﬂat in relation to changes in output: big changes in ﬁscal feedback on output
only result in small changes in welfare. The reason for this may, in turn be that, with
simple Calvo contracts, control of inﬂation, together with its ability to jump, is suﬃcient
to avoid the cumulative and hence cyclical movements in the terms of trade (price level)
which were noted above. In all the cases in Table 2, the gains to ﬁscal stabilisation are
very much smaller than in Table 1.11 This suggests that a large amount of gains to ﬁscal
stabilisation in Table 1 are due to backward looking elements in the Phillips curve.
It is easy to understand the reasons for this. Suppose for some reason that output in
one country rises and output in the other country falls, with no impact on union output.
When there is inﬂation inertia, inﬂation in the country with higher output will gradually
rise. As discussed above, this means that real interest rates in that country will therefore
fall, (because nominal interest rates are ﬁxed at the union level and there is no reason
for monetary policy to change). Lower real interest rates put further upward pressure
on output and inﬂation. Feedback from this higher inﬂation to a tighter ﬁscal policy
helps to restrain this destabilising pressure, but, even if this pressure towards instability
is avoided, the adjustment mechanism is slow and cyclical.12 In contrast, if inﬂation
is entirely forward-looking, as in the New Keynesian Phillips curve, it would jump up
and then gradually fall, so the expected real interest rate would always be higher. This
increase in the expected real interest rate will help to stabilise the economy.
5 Blanchard-Yaari Consumers
The model above assumes inﬁnitely lived consumers. If taxes were lump sum, then these
consumers would be unaﬀected by the timing of taxes, and Ricardian Equivalence would
14hold. In our model taxes are distortionary, as we assume a constant income tax rate.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to investigate how robust our results are to introducing
an additional departure from Ricardian Equivalence, where we replace inﬁnitely lived
consumers by consumers with ﬁnite lives, using the framework due to Blanchard and Yaari
(Blanchard (1985)). (Blanchard/Yaari consumers are also modelled in Leith and Wren-
Lewis (2006a) who examine issues of stability and monetary/ﬁscal policy interaction in a
monetary union, as well as Smets and Wouters (2002) and Ganelli (2005)). Introducing
Blanchard/Yaari consumers does, however, introduce costs in terms of complexity, which
is why we do not examine them in the base case.
5.1 The Model
We need to make a number of changes to our model, described by equations (24)– (34),
see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006a), Smets and Wouters (2002) and Appendix A.1. First,
as consumers have a constant probability of death, p, the discount factor in formula (1)
becomes β/(1 + p). Second, in the household budget constraint (5), the discount factor
takes account of mortality, Et(Qt,t+1) = 1
(1+it)(1+p). Third, these modiﬁcations and the fact
that we now have an inﬁnite number of living cohorts at each moment of time, results in a
new system for aggregate variables. The ﬁrst order conditions for individual consumption,
and then aggregation of all such behavioural equations, leads to a pair of equations for
aggregate consumption and for the average propensity to consume, instead of the single
Euler equation (6):




(Et ˆ Ak,t+1−Etˆ πk,t+1−Etˆ Φk,t+1))−σ(ˆ ıt−Etˆ πk,t+1)+ˆ ξkt, (40)
(1 + p)(1 + i)
βσ(1 + i)σ
ˆ Φk,t = Etˆ Φk,t+1 − (1 − σ)(ˆ ıt − Etˆ πk,t+1) − ˆ ξk,t, (41)
where, as before, k = {a,b}, and where 1/Φk,t is average propensity to consume out of
total resources, resources which consist of nominal ﬁnancial wealth and human wealth.
For derivation of this result see Appendix A.1. Financial assets, which now aﬀect con-
sumption, are deﬁned as Ak,t = Ak,t/Pk,t−1 where Ak,t is the stock of nominal assets.
Their evolution over time is described by:







ˆ Ck,t + αn ˆ Sk,t
￿
). (42)
The evolution of the nominal stock of debt, Bk,t, can be described by the following
equation (denoting Bk,t = Bk,t/Pk,t−1) :







The amount of bonds issued is equal to the amount of bonds held:
ˆ Aa,t + ˆ Ab,t = ˆ Ba,t + ˆ Bb,t. (44)
15Equations (40) and (41) can be written in terms of gap variables and for each country.
The resulting four equations should now be included in a system like that shown in
equations (24)– (34), instead of equations (24), (25).
To evaluate gains and losses we need a welfare metric. In the Blanchard-Yaari case,
unlike in the inﬁnitely-lived case, there is no obvious choice. Ideally total welfare should
be evaluated using a social welfare function that aggregates across generations and weights
the utility of every generation. It is not clear, however, how to treat future unborn gener-
ations. Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) discuss the importance of including unborn generations
in the social welfare metric. If they are excluded, we introduce an additional source of
time-inconsistency, as a policy which treats some particular generation diﬀerently will
be necessarily time-inconsistent. However, straightforward aggregating of the utilities of
unborn generations is not feasible for computational reasons. One way to overcome this
diﬃculty is to suggest that the government uses a weighting scheme that makes the ag-
gregate welfare of overlapping generations equivalent to the welfare of one inﬁnitely long
lived generation of consumers. A similar strategy was also adopted by Calvo and Obstfeld
(1988). We therefore use formulae (36) and (37) to obtain our results.
5.2 Results
Table 3 repeats Table 1 for the model with Blanchard/Yaari consumers. The results are
very similar to those obtained for inﬁnitely lived consumers above. This is in part a
consequence of the small degree of debt feedback. Although Blanchard/Yaari consumers
allow for the additional eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on consumption behaviour, for realistic values
of the probability of death the extent to which debt inﬂuences consumption remains small,
and is a similar order of magnitude to the optimal degree of ﬁscal feedback in Table 3. As
a result, the two inﬂuences on debt are not only small but they oﬀset each other in terms
of their net inﬂuence on demand. As a result, the model with Blanchard/Yaari consumers
and optimal ﬁscal feedback behaves in a very similar manner to the model with inﬁnitely
lived consumers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the potential role for ﬁscal policy to help stabilise indi-
vidual economies within a monetary union. While the vulnerability of monetary unions
to asymmetric shocks is well known, there has been surprisingly little analysis of the ex-
tent to which ﬁscal policy can help to solve the resulting problems. This is despite the
fact that policy makers in potential members of the European Monetary Union have ac-
tively discussed the possibility of using ﬁscal policy in this way (Treasury, 2003; Swedish
Committee, 2002).
Our analysis looks at the potential welfare gains which might arise when national
governments follow simple rules for ﬁscal policy. We ﬁnd that there are substantial welfare
gains if government expenditure responds to both national diﬀerences in inﬂation and
one of either national diﬀerences in output or changes in the terms of trade. The more
persistent is inﬂation, the larger are these gains. We might also expect these gains to
16be larger if there are other rigidities (for example in the labour market) in the economy
that are not captured in the model. In practice of course, it might not be possible to
fully realise these gains as the level of institutional ﬂexibility we have assumed for ﬁscal
policy exceeds that of current arrangements. We have also shown that a fully optimal
ﬁscal policy might achieve even larger welfare gains. But such a policy might well require
even further institutional ﬂexibility, possibly to an unrealistic degree. It might also lead
to undesirable ‘competition’ between ﬁscal and monetary policy at the aggregate union
level.
We also ﬁnd that the optimal feedback from government debt is only slightly above
the minimum level required to ensure solvency. This result appears robust to replacing
inﬁnitely lived consumers with consumers of a Blanchard-Yaari type. Such a small feed-
back on debt is what makes it possible for ﬁscal policy to pursue the stabilisation gains
described in the previous paragraph.
These results have three important implications for the debate on how ﬁscal policy
should be managed in a monetary union. First, we ﬁnd that the potential gains from ﬁscal
stabilisation remain signiﬁcant, even if we restrict ﬁscal policy to respond to diﬀerences
between national and union wide variables. Such a restriction is important, both because
it would prevent the ﬁscal authorities from ‘ﬁghting’ the monetary authority in dealing
with union-wide shocks, and also because restricting ﬁscal policy in this way might help
avoid some of the political economy concerns that have been expressed about ﬁscal sta-
bilisation. Second, these gains are very greatly reduced if ﬁscal policy does not react to
inter-country diﬀerences in inﬂation but responds only to diﬀerences in output (as sug-
gested by Treasury (2003)). Third, there appears to be no conﬂict between stabilising
asymmetric shocks and the requirements for debt sustainability.
17Notes
1In some respects our set up is more restrictive than Beetsma and Jensen (2005): for
example, we assume that our two economies are of equal size whereas they do not do this.
2See also Duarte and Wolman (2002).
3See Mankiw (2001), Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) among many others.
4See Kirsanova, Vines, and Wren-Lewis (2006), which looks at the stability issues in a
monetary union, but which ignores welfare analysis.
5See Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) for an analysis of stabilisation policies against
asymmetric shocks using a static two-country model.
6We make this parameter stochastic to allow us to generate shocks to the mark-up of
ﬁrms.
7Here and below all references to Appendices refer to the Technical Appendix to this
paper, which is available from the authors upon request and also from www.people.ex.ac.uk/
tkirsano/AppendixRULES.pdf.
8The derivation is identical to the one in Steinsson (2003), amended by the introduction
of mark-up shocks as in Beetsma and Jensen (2004) and by accounting for the open
economy. A detailed derivation is given in Appendix A.2.
9Lagrange multipliers are integrals of the predetermined variables, so they change
slowly. In this sense, the coeﬃcients in the columns can be thought of as describing the
immediate reaction of policy instruments to a shock. We do not report the reaction of
monetary policy to preference shocks, because cost-push shocks are quantitatively more
important.
10Table 1 shows numerically that in the model with inﬂation inertia, if the ﬁscal au-
thorities feed back on inﬂation, then additional feedbacks on output and the terms of
trade are close substitutes.
11The absolute size of the welfare loss in Table 2 compared to Table 1 is diﬀerent because
the models are diﬀerent, even though we assume the same standard errors of shock hitting
the economy. The percentage reduction in the loss when we have ﬁscal feedback is much
smaller – it is in fact in the order of 10 times smaller in Table 2 than in Table 1. Note
however that if there was no inﬂation persistence in the economy, then there would be
a very strong case for examining persistent shocks, which would substantially raise the
gains from ﬁscal stabilisation. We have not done that here.
12For detailed dynamic analysis of instability mechanisms in a monetary union when

































































































Absolute Units 14.69 14.00 14.07 13.91 14.13 14.17 14.13 14.52 14.51 14.33
of Loss
% of steady state 0.00 0.35 0.31 0.39 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.09 0.09 0.18
consumption
Optimal Coeﬃcients for Fiscal Policy in country a
Cost push ˆ  a 0 0 0 -4.98 0 0 0 0 0 0
shock
Inﬂation πa 0 -2.68 -3.31 -3.76 -2.60 -2.08 -2.55 -1.65 0 0
Output ya 0 -1.54 -2.50 -1.43 -0.30 -1.09 0 0 0 -1.21
Debt ˆ Ba -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Cost push ˆ  b 0 0 0 4.98 0 0 0 0 0 0
shock
Inﬂation πb 0 2.57 0 3.76 2.60 2.08 2.55 1.65 0 0
Output yb 0 -0.94 0 1.43 0.30 1.09 0 0 0 1.21
Terms of s 0 -1.07 -0.06 -0.21 -1.09 0 -1.34 0 -0.84 0
Trade
Optimal Commitment Solution for Monetary Policy (selected feedback coeﬃcients)
Cost push
ˆ  a+ˆ  b




2 0.24 -0.36 -0.66 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Output
ya+yb
2 0.06 -0.81 -0.77 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Debt ˆ Ba, ˆ Bb -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Assets ˆ Aa, ˆ Ab 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
For reference: minimum possible loss under fully optimal commitment solution is 13.72
Table 1: Coeﬃcients of Fiscal Rule (35). Model with inﬁnitely lived consumers and

































































































Absolute Units 0.5256 0.5241 0.5250 0.5236 0.5241 0.5242 0.5248 0.5248 0.5256 0.5256
of Loss
% of steady state 0.00 7.71 3.14 10.06 7.47 7.09 3.95 3.94 0.00 0.09
consumption∗
Optimal Coeﬃcients for Fiscal Policy in country a
Cost push ˆ  a 0 0 0 -0.38 0 0 0 0 0 0
shock
Inﬂation πa 0 -0.53 -0.64 -0.26 -0.53 -0.55 -0.47 -0.47 0 0
Output ya 0 1.50 0.02 1.45 1.46 1.41 0 0 0 -0.26
Debt ˆ Ba -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Cost push ˆ  b 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 0 0 0 0
shock
Inﬂation πb 0 0.53 0 0.26 0.53 0.55 0.47 0.47 0 0
Output yb 0 -1.42 0 -1.45 -1.46 -1.41 0 0 0 0.26
Terms of s 0 -0.97 -0.50 -0.66 -0.96 0 -0.12 0 0.03 0
Trade
Optimal Commitment Solution for Monetary Policy (selected feedback coeﬃcients)
Cost push
ˆ  a+ˆ  b
2 1.10 1.10 1.12 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
shock
Debt ˆ Ba, ˆ Bb -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
Assets ˆ Aa, ˆ Ab 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
For reference: minimum possible loss under fully optimal commitment solution is 0.5225
Notes:
∗ – numbers presented in this line should be multiplied by 10−4
Table 2: Coeﬃcients of Fiscal Rule (35). Model with inﬁnitely lived consumers and

































































































Absolute Units 14.67 14.00 14.07 13.91 14.12 14.17 14.12 14.50 14.50 14.33
of Loss
% of steady state 0.00 0.34 0.30 0.38 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.09 0.09 0.17
consumption
Optimal Coeﬃcients for Fiscal Policy in country a
Cost push ˆ  a 0 0 0 -4.90 0 0 0 0 0 0
shock
Inﬂation πa 0 -0.14 -3.31 -3.29 -2.55 -2.09 -2.55 -1.66 0 0
Output ya 0 -0.29 -2.49 -0.95 0.00 -1.07 0 0 0 -1.19
Debt ˆ Ba -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Cost push ˆ  b 0 0 0 4.90 0 0 0 0 0 0
shock
Inﬂation πb 0 5.01 0 3.29 2.55 2.09 2.55 1.6671 0 0
Output yb 0 0.04 0 0.95 -0.00 1.07 0 0 0 1.19
Terms of s 0 -1.21 -0.05 -0.56 -1.33 0 -1.33 0 -0.82 0
Trade
Optimal Commitment Solution for Monetary Policy (selected feedback coeﬃcients)
Cost push
ˆ  a+ˆ  b




2 0.23 0.33 -0.66 0.23 0.232 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23
Output
ya+yb
2 0.05 -0.08 -0.77 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Debt ˆ Ba, ˆ Bb -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Assets ˆ Aa, ˆ Ab 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
For reference: minimum possible loss under fully optimal commitment solution is 13.72
Table 3: Coeﬃcients of Fiscal Rule (35). Model with Blanchard-Yaari consumers and
government solvency constraint, Phillips curve with inﬂation inertia
















































































Figure 1: Impulse responses to a unit cost push shock. Solid line denotes the case ‘debt
only’, dashed line denotes the case ‘diﬀerences’. Model with Phillips curve with inﬂation
inertia and inﬁnitely lived consumers.
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